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Abstract
We study the consistency of the credit-risk orderings implicit in ratings
and bond market yields. By analyzing errors in term structure estimates for
bonds with particular ratings, we show that for significant periods, a quarter
of some categories of high credit quality bonds are rated in a manner that is
inconsistent with their pricing. Adjusting for economic determinants of spreads
(tax, liquidity and risk premiums) and allowing for the dynamic adjustment of
ratings and spreads largely eliminates the inconsistencies, however.
JEL Nos: C25, G21, G33.
Keywords: Credit Spreads, Risky Debt Yields, Term Structure.
∗We thank Patricia Jackson, Pamela Nickell and seminar participants at the Bank of England, the
Netherlands Bank and the CEPR, and three anonymous referees for valuable comments, and Simone
Varotto for help with data. Views expressed are the authors’ own and not necessarily those of the
Bank of England. Comments on this paper should be addressed to wperraudin@bankofengland.co.uk
or to ataylor@econ.bbk.ac.uk.
1
1 Introduction
Long-term bond ratings produced by agencies like Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s
provide financial market participants with judgments, of a standardized nature, on
the likelihood that bond issues will be repaid in an orderly manner. The importance
of ratings as a source of information to investors has increased in recent years as
bond markets have grown more international and come to include a wider range of
obligors.1 Ratings have also acquired new roles, as supervisory authorities have made
regulatory requirements for financial institutions contingent on ratings.2 Recently,
it has been suggested (see Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (1999)) that
regulatory capital for G10 banks be based in part on the agency ratings of the bank’s
borrowers.
In view of the increasing reliance on bond ratings in credit risk markets, it is
important to ask how reliable are ratings as indicators of credit standing, both in
general and for particular types of obligor. In particular, are ratings consistent, cross-
sectionally and over time, with other measures of credit risk? Two recent papers have
critically examined ratings as measures of default risk in this way.
First, Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998) show that firms with given accounting
ratios received a significantly lower rating in the early 1990s than firms with similar
accounting ratios would have received in the late 1970s and early 1980s.3 The im-
plication is that rating agencies have changed the way in which they evaluate credit
standing.
Second, Delianedis and Geske (1998), use equity and liability data for US firms, to
construct alternative credit risk indicators and compare their forecasting performance
to that of ratings. They conclude that the default probabilities generated by their
1In December 1970, 98.0%, 0.3%, and a negligible fraction of Moody’s-rated obligors were domi-
ciled respectively in the USA, Europe and Japan. By end-December 1989, issuers from the US,
Japan, the UK and other European countries were 84.7%, 2.1%, 2.3% and 4.3% respectively, while
by December 1997, they were 66.0% 4.7%, 5.4% and 20.0%.
2See Cantor and Packer (1994)
3The basic approach of Blume, Lim, and MacKinlay (1998) follows that of Kaplan and Urwitz
(1979) who show that ratings may be reasonably well predicted using accounting information.
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models increase well in advance of ratings down-grades. They cite this as evidence of
“rating stickiness”, i.e., that rating agencies do not immediately change ratings when
news affecting an obligor’s credit quality is revealed.
In this paper, we study a third aspect of ratings, namely their consistency or
otherwise with bond market prices. Altman (1989) shows that, for all years from
1973 to 1987, mean yields to maturity increase monotonically as one descends the
ratings scale. However, Altman’s finding only implies that average bond spreads and
ratings are consistent. If individual spreads within a particular rating category vary a
lot around their mean, it may be that the implicit credit quality ordering attributed
to obligors by the rating agencies and the bond market are very different.
To investigate this empirically, we extract average yields for different rating cat-
egories using Nelson-Siegel techniques as described in Nelson and Siegel (1987). The
data we employ consists of ratings and price histories in the period 1988 to 1998
for a large number of non-callable, dollar-denominated international bonds, primarily
Eurobonds. For each trading day, we calculate yields for different maturities for the
three highest credit quality rating categories, AAA, AA, and A. We then compare the
bonds’ actual market values with the prices they would have if a claim to the bond’s
cash flows were priced with our estimated yields.
We say that a bond valuation is inconsistent with its rating if the market price is
above (below) the price it would have if it were valued using average term structures
corresponding to a higher (lower) rating category. Thus, the price of a AAA bond
is inconsistent with its rating if it is lower than the value one obtains using the AA
term structure. Similarly, a AA bond price is inconsistent with the bond’s rating if
it is higher than the price obtained using the AAA term structure or below that one
obtains using the A term structure.
We find that, on average, between a fifth and a quarter of AA bonds are priced
in a way that is inconsistent with their ratings. Smaller fractions of AAA and A-
rated bonds are inconsistent but only because these can only be misclassified in one
direction (down for AAA and up for A since we only consider A and above rated
bonds in our study).
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Some fraction of bond price variation no doubt reflects liquidity, risk premiums and
tax effects. To allow for these influences, we regress pricing errors from the Nelson-
Siegel fits on variables designed to proxy for economic determinants of spreads, i.e.,
risk premiums, liquidity and tax. The risk premium variables are based on bond
market factor “betas”. Liquidity proxies include the age and face value of the bond
issue and the frequency with which it is quoted. The proxy for tax effects is the coupon
rate. Subtracting the fitted value of these effects (the regression coefficient times the
regressor) from the market price, we once again compare our market prices, this time
adjusted for liquidity and tax effects, with the prices obtained using estimated yields
for superior and inferior ratings categories.
When we adjust for tax, liquidity and risk premiums, around a third of the in-
consistencies are eliminated. The dynamic adjustment of bond ratings and spreads
mean that after six months around a half of the remaining inconsistencies disappear.
Hence, we conclude that ratings and bond market yields suitably adjusted are reason-
ably consistent, contrary to what one might believe if one looked at the unadjusted
data alone.
A substantial number of earlier studies have looked at the relationship between
ratings and bond prices. West (1973), Liu and Thakor (1984), Kao and Wu (1990),
Ederington, Yawitz, and Roberts (1987) find that, conditional on economic and firm
specific variables, ratings do have explanatory power for bond yields. In these stud-
ies, the ratings may proxy for (publicly known) omitted variables which affect yield
spreads. To avoid this problem of firm-specific omitted variables, several studies
have examined whether rating changes coincide with excess returns on either the
obligor’s equity or debt values (see Katz (1974), Weinstein (1977), Griffin and San-
vicente (1982), Ingram, Brooks, and Copeland (1983), Hand, Holthausen, and Left-
wich (1992), Goh and Ederington (1993), Kliger and Sarig (2000)). While evidence
from the earlier studies was mixed, the more recent contributions suggest that rating
changes do impart some new information, not publicly available to the investor.
A significant part of our study involves estimation of term structures for corpo-
rate bonds. Earlier papers which have extracted such term structure estimates include
Sarig and Warga (1989), Schwartz (1998) and Dullmann, Uhrig-Homburg, and Wind-
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fuhr (1998). None of these has examined bond-spread/rating inconsistencies of the
kind we analyze here, however, although both Schwartz (1998) and Dullmann, Uhrig-
Homburg, and Windfuhr (1998) observe crossings in the mean spreads for different
rating categories and Schwartz (1998) discusses trading strategies based on these
inconsistencies.
Finally, note that an important literature has recently emerged on the deter-
minants of bond market spreads. Notable contributions to this literature include
Delianedis and Geske (1999), Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001), Elton, Gru-
ber, Agrawal, and Mann (2000), Huang and Huang (2002) and Houweling, Mentinck,
and Vorst (2003). These papers model determinants of spreads as we do when we
adjust spreads for non-credit pricing factors.4 But they do not share our focus on a
comparison of credit risk orderings implicit in ratings.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our bond data set
and the Nelson-Siegel techniques we use to extract estimates of average yield curves
for different rating categories. Section 3 sets out our basic results. Section 4 discusses
adjustments for tax and liquidity effects. Section 5 examines the persistence of mis-
classifications and the characteristics of bonds for which the market valuation and
rating are most commonly inconsistent.
2 Data and Curve Fitting Techniques
2.1 The Bond Price Data Set
The bond price data set, from which we calculate daily term structure estimates, is
the same as that employed in Nickell, Perraudin, and Varotto (2000). It consists of
1,430 US dollar-denominated bonds5 selected from the much larger number of dollar-
denominated bonds listed on the Reuters 3000 price service. The bonds are selected
4Here and elsewhere in the paper, we use the term “non-credit effects” to refer to determinants
of spreads apart from expected losses.
5Of which 90% are Eurobonds.
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using the criteria (i) that they are straight bonds (not floaters), (ii) that they are
neither callable nor convertible, (iii) that a rating history is available, (iv) that the
coupons are constant with a fixed frequency, (v) that repayment is at par, and (vi)
that the bond does not possess a sinking fund. To arrive at the 1,430, we further
eliminate bonds for which the price and rating histories do not overlap for more than
a year, and very illiquid bonds with price histories which contain at least one gap of
more than 100 days.
The prices we use are Reuters composite bids, i.e., the best bid reported at close
of trading by a market-maker from which Reuters has a data feed. The data includes
comprehensive information on the cash flows, ratings and price histories of the bonds,
and the name, domicile and industry code of the obligor. The price data stretches
from April 1991 to March 1998. The break-down of bonds by industry and domicile
of the obligor is given in detail in Nickell, Perraudin, and Varotto (2000). 45%, 9%
and 23% of obligors are domiciled respectively in the US, Japan and in one of the
four largest European countries. 24% and 42% of obligors are commercial banks or
other financial services, respectively, with the remainder coming from a wide range of
non-financial industries. 58%, 19% and 14% of bonds are categorized as unsecured,
guaranteed and senior.
The data set includes a rating history for each bond, the majority coming from
Moody’s or Standard and Poor’s. To obtain a rating history for a particular bond,
we observed which rating agency first rated the bond issue (usually either Moody’s
or Standard and Poors) and continued to use ratings only from that agency.
2.2 Curve Fitting Techniques
In this section, we briefly describe the Nelson-Siegel techniques we employ to estimate
term structure for bonds in specific rating categories. This method fits the term
structure to a parametric form that is flexible enough to fit most shapes observed in
yield curves. The method performs well against other competing methods such as
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spline fitting techniques.6
Suppose we have N bonds with prices Pi and cashflows cij for i=1,2,...,N and
j=1,2,...,Ji paid on dates tij for i=1,2,...,N and j=1,2,...,Ji. Suppose N is large so the
parsimoniously parameterized interpolation fits each bond with error:
Pi =
Ji∑
j=1
cij exp [−h(tij)tij] + i (1)
h(tij) ≡ a1 + a2[1− exp(−tij/a4]/(tij/a4)− a3 exp(−tij/a4) (2)
It is assumed that Variance(i) = w
2
i σ
2, i.e., the errors terms are heteroskedastic. A
common approach 7 is to suppose that, for a given bond, the parameter wi is closely
related to the bond’s duration. I.e., if Yi is defined implicitly by Pi =
∑Ji
j=1 cij/(1 +
Yi)
tij , then wi = dPi/dYi.
The coefficients a1, a2, a3 and a4 are found by minimizing the sum of squared
weighted error terms ˜i ≡ i/wi. This is equivalent to performing an ordinary
least squares regression on the transformed variables P˜i ≡ Pi/(dPi/dYi) and c˜ij ≡
cij/(dPi/dYi), i.e., estimating the regression
P˜i =
Ji∑
j=1
c˜ij exp [−h(tij)tij] + ˜i (3)
For each day in our sample period, we select bonds that have both a price quote and
a current rating and perform a separate term structure fit for the bonds in each rating
category. We omit bonds with maturities under one year since they are likely to be
illiquid. To prevent grossly mis-priced bonds from unduly affecting the results, we run
regressions repeatedly, dropping any bond prices which, in the previous regression,
were more than four standard deviations from the fitted price. We ceased iterating
when all bond prices satisfied this condition.
6Bliss (1997) compares four different techniques to fitting government bond term structures:
cubic splines (McCulloch (1975)), smoothing splines (Fisher, Nychka, and Zervos (1995)), parametric
fitting function (Nelson and Siegel (1987)) , bootstrap method (Fama and Bliss (1987)) and finds
that Nelson-Siegel perform reasonably well. In any case, our results are not sensitive to the method
of fitting the yield curve in that we obtain qualitatively the same results using cubic spline fitting
as described in McCulloch (1975).
7See, for example, McCulloch (1975)
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3 Rating and Valuation (In)-Consistency
3.1 Yield Estimates
Implementing the Nelson-Siegel fitting techniques described above, we obtain term
structures for each day in our sample period for AAA, AA and A-rated bonds. Since
our conclusions depend on the accuracy of our term structure estimates, we restrict
our attention to the three coarse rating categories for which we have a substantial
amount of information; even though it would have been possible to estimate term
structures for BBB bonds for the latter part of the sample period, or for finer rating
categories such as AA- and AA+. The average number of bonds we employed on the
days for which we performed term structure spline fits was 161, 125, and 136 for the
three categories AAA, AA and A, respectively.
Figure 1 shows time series plots of our fitted spreads for 2-, 5- and 10-year matu-
rities. The default-free interest rates we used in calculating the spreads are Treasury
strip yields obtained from Bloomberg. The general picture that emerges from the
figure is one of a gradual decline in spreads from 1991 to the second half of 1997. It
is noticeable that the spreads are highly correlated. Also, the spreads cross on very
few occasions and by only marginal amounts.8
Figure 2 shows estimated densities of the errors from the Nelson-Siegel fits for the
three rating categories.9 The errors correspond to ˜i in the notation employed above.
Hence, they represent differences between Nelson-Siegel fit prices and market prices
divided by dPi/dYi. If Pif is the fitted price, ˜i = ((Pif−Pi)/Pi)/(‖dPi/dYi‖/Pi) and,
thus, the errors are in units of proportional mis-pricings divided by duration. They
are, therefore, approximately in units of per annum yields. Since we also multiply
by 10,000, one may regard the horizontal axis in the figure as being expressed in
8Schwartz (1998) found much larger numbers of “crossings” but he mostly employed fewer bonds
and used finer rating categories. The only place in the paper in which we employ the Bloomberg
Treasury yields is in calculating spreads for Figure 1. So the fact that there are a few dates on which
our AAA yields are apparently lower than the Treasury yields does not affect our analysis.
9The errors are pooled across the monthly Nelson-Siegel fits. Observations are “bucketed” in
discrete ranges and then the fraction falling into each range is plotted.
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annualized basis points.
A noticeable feature of the densities for the different rating categories is that they
exhibit approximately the same variance. This despite the fact that the magnitude
of spreads and the volatility of spread changes are distinctly smaller for the AAA
category than for AA or A. It is striking that, for much of the sample period, AAA
spreads are around 20 basis points, whereas the price errors for AAA bonds as shown
in Figure 2 exceed 20 basis points with a reasonably high probability.
Figure 3 further illustrates the variation of prices around the fitted values by
showing the standard deviation of the error distribution over time. The calculations
are done on a weekly basis, pooling the errors from the daily Nelson-Siegel fits within
each week. The standard errors fall sharply over time, in line with the declines in
the levels of spreads evident in Figure 1. The standard deviations, however, are
large relative to what one might expect given the magnitudes of the spreads between
adjacent rating categories.
3.2 Weak misclassifications
For the first day of each month in the sample period, we calculate for each bond10
the price the bond would have if its coupon and principal payments were discounted
using the term structure implied by the Nelson-Siegel estimates. We do this not just
using the term structure appropriate to the rating category that the bond has on the
day in question, but also using term structures for other rating categories as well. For
each bond, this yields three fitted prices:
Pˆ ri =
Ji∑
j=1
cij exp
[
−h(r)(tij)tij
]
for r = AAA,AA,A . (4)
Here, h(r) is the Nelson-Siegel fit function estimated from data with rating r.
We say an r-rated bond is weakly misclassified if its market price is closer to a
fitted bond price based on a term structure other than r than it is to P ri . In other
10Bonds with maturities between 1 and 10 years are selected for this analysis
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words, an r-rated bond is weakly misclassified if
‖Pi − Pˆmi ‖ < ‖Pi − Pˆ ri ‖ for some m 6= r . (5)
For the first day of each month in the sample period, we calculate what fraction of
the market prices available on that day are closest in value to each of the three fitted
prices based on AAA, AA and A term structures. The results of these calculations
are reported in Table 1.11
For AAA-rated bonds, on average, 72% have market prices closest to the prices
based on the AAA term structures. As one might expect, very few AAA bonds are
most closely priced using single A term structures. The fraction of AA bonds which
are weakly misclassified is much larger. On average, 33% have market prices closer to
the prices based on AAA term structures and a further 24%, on average, have prices
closer to the A term structure prices. Of A-rated bonds, 29% are weakly misclassified
on average across the sample period.
3.3 Strong misclassifications
The fact that bonds are weakly misclassified as defined above does not imply that
ratings and bond market pricing are strictly speaking inconsistent. Even if ratings
and yields reflect the same ranking of credit standing, an AA-rated bond which is
close to the “frontier” between AA-rated and A-rated bonds, may have a market price
which is closer to the price one obtains using A rating yields than to the price based
on the AA term structure.
However, if the market price of a bond is above (below) the price one obtains if
one values the bond’s cash flows using the term structure for the rating above (below)
the bond’s current rating, the ordinal ranking of credit quality implicit in the ratings
and in bond market yields must necessarily be different. If a bond has a market price
11As mentioned above, there are a few occasions in our sample period when the term structures
for different rating categories cross. To prevent such crossings influencing our results, we replace
any yield that is below the yield for a superior rating category with the latter yield for the day in
question. Hence, in our adjusted term structure data, any crossings are replaced with zero yield
spreads. We find that the over all results are qualitatively the same with or without this correction.
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which is “too high” or “too low” in this sense, we say it is strongly misclassified. More
formally, an r-rated bond with market price Pi is strongly misclassified if
Pi > Pˆ
m
i where m is a superior rating category than r (6)
or if Pi < Pˆ
m
i where m is an inferior rating category to r . (7)
Table 1 shows the fractions of bonds on the first day of each month in the sample
period which are strongly misclassified. On average, over the sample period, 16% of
AAA bonds are misclassified down, 14% of A bonds are misclassified up, and 28%
AA-rated bonds are either misclassified up or down.
4 Risk Premiums, Tax and Liquidity
It is clearly possible that the large number of strong misclassifications in our sam-
ple reflects non-credit related pricing factors such as risk premiums, liquidity or tax
effects. To control for these non-credit-related factors, we perform the strong mis-
classification calculations described above but adjusting for risk premiums, tax and
liquidity effects.
The first step in making these adjustments is, for the first day of each month in
our sample period, to regress the fitted, weighted residuals from the Nelson-Siegel fit,
denoted ˜i in equation (3), on a set of explanatory variables. These variables include
the coupon rate of the bond as a proxy for tax effects, and the issue-size, age of the
issue and the quote frequency as proxies for liquidity effects. The quote frequency is
defined as the fraction of days on which the bond issue is quoted from the current
date to the maturity date of the bond or the end of the sample, whichever occurs
first.
To allow for risk premiums, betas from time series regressions of spreads on widely
used bond market risk factors were included in the set of explanatory variables. The
factors we employ are (i) the difference between the yields on 5-year BBB2-rated
corporate bonds and the 5-year pure discount Treasury rate and (ii) the difference
between the 1-year and the 10-year pure pure discount Treasury rates. The source for
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these is Bloomberg. These factors closely resemble the bond market factors employed
by Fama and French (1993).
Our basic cross-sectional regression equation may be summarized as
˜i =
K∑
k
λ1,kβki +
J∑
j
λ2,jxji + ηi (8)
where xji are the liquidity and tax variables and the βki are time-series betas with
respect to the bond market factors. Running this regressions yields estimates of the
prices of risk λrk and the sensitivities λcj of spreads to the liquidity and tax variables.
Because many of the bonds in our sample have relatively short price times se-
ries, one must use daily data to estimate the betas with repsect to the bond market
factors. Estimating the betas is complicated by noise in the estimated spreads (at-
tributable either to errors in the Nelson-Siegel fit or to underlying noise in the quote
data). Regressing the daily bond returns on factor returns yields beta estimates that
contain considerable estimation error and have low significance in the cross sectional
regressions.
To overcome this we estimate the time series betas by regressing the individual
bond spreads on factor yields as follows:
˜it = consti + βiyc,t + βiys,t + ηi,t . (9)
where yc,t and ys,t are respectively the credit and slope bond market factor yields.
This approach of running regressions in levels rather than differences is suggested
by Cochrane (2003) (see his page 296 and his discussion of Lucas (1988)) as a way
of coping with noisy observations. It is also the approach followed by Houweling,
Mentinck, and Vorst (2003), although they do not comment on the fact that it is in
some ways non standard.
Warga (1992) has shown that there is a significant age premium in bond re-
turns, and previous studies, including Vasicek and Fong (1982), Bliss (1997), Schwartz
(1998) and Dullmann, Uhrig-Homburg, and Windfuhr (1998) suggest that variables
such as age, coupon and issue size have important explanatory power in explaining
errors in risk-free and defaultable term structure fits. Crabbe and Turner (1995) ar-
gue that size of issue does not affect spreads and we shall return to a discussion of
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this point below. The relative quote frequency, as we define it, resembles variables
found to be significant by Clare, Oozeer, Priestley, and Thomas (2000) and Elton,
Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001).
To obtain an idea of a sensible specification for the liquidity proxies (the relations
might, after all, be significantly non-linear), we plotted the Nelson-Siegel fit residuals
against these variables. The plots (which we do not exhibit here) suggest that the
coupon variable affects the Nelson-Siegel fit residuals in a linear way, while the de-
pendency on age appears to be exponential. The nature of the issue size and quote
frequency effects are less obvious but we take them to be linear. The age variable
is, therefore, included as exp(−age) where age is in years from the issue date. The
issue size variable is expressed is the face value of the issue measured in hundreds of
millions of dollars12, while the coupon rate is expressed in percent.
Finally, note that we decided not to include other bond or issuer characteristics
in the regression since our aim was to fit economic determinants of the spread not to
describe the spread data set.
4.1 Regression Results
Performing the monthly regressions described above of Nelson-Siegel residuals on risk
premium, tax and liquidity proxies, we obtained monthly time series of regression
parameters. Tables 2 and 3 contain parameter estimates, t-statistics, R2’s and num-
ber of observations, all averaged across the monthly regressions. To understand the
magnitude of the effects, note that the dependent variable is in units of basis points.
The coupon rate is in percent, the age effect is included as an exponentials (and hence
range from 1 for zero age to zero for very old issues) and the quote frequency variable
is in natural units (i.e., between zero and unity).
The magnitudes of tax and liquidity effects are economically substantial and sta-
tistically significant. For example, the coupon parameters are significant at a 5% level
81%, 67% and 63% of the time for the AAA, AA, and A-rated bond regressions. All
12The average bond issue size in the sample is $250 million.
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the liquidity variables are significant more than 50% of the time but quote frequency
is most statistically significant, being significant at a 5% level 75%, 76% and 52%
of the time for the AAA, AA and A-rated bond regressions. Issue size is the least
significant variable, being significant at a 5% level 41%, 16% and 28% of the time.
The most significant variable of all is the credit factor which is significant 84%, 81%
and 63% of the time.
To see whether our strong misclassifications are the result of tax and liquidity
effects, we use the monthly time series of regression coefficients for the tax, liquidity
and risk premium variables to implement a time varying correction for the tax and
liquidity effects. We adjust the bond price upwards by the part of the fitted regression
corresponding to the non-credit-related pricing factors by adding to each bond’s mar-
ket price the regression coefficients times the relevant bond-specific regressors. We
then repeat the comparisons described above between market prices and prices cal-
culated using yields for the different rating categories, except now we replace market
prices with tax-liquidity-risk-premium-adjusted market prices.
The results we obtain for strong misclassifications are shown in Table 4 and Figure
5. On average over the sample period, the strong misclassifications equal 9% of AAA-
rated bonds, 18% of AA bonds and 10% of A-rated bonds. As before, we regard
the AA percentage as giving a better idea of the proportion of misclassified bonds
since AA bonds can be misclassified up or down. We conclude that the fraction
of misclassified bonds is substantially reduced by risk premium, tax and liquidity
adjustments.
4.2 Dynamic Adjustment to Misclassified
Having adjusted for risk premiums and liquidity and tax effects, we still find that
18% of AA-rated bonds and around 10% of AAA and A-rated bonds are misclassified.
We wish to examine whether this reflects lags in spread and ratings changes. It is
acknowledged by the rating agencies that ratings changes may be delayed as the
process of adjusting ratings entails a time-consuming, bureaucratic process within
the agency involved. Equally, spreads may experience temporary fluctuations that
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are subsequently reversed as aggregate bond market liquidity is squeezed.
In Table 5, we report the percentages of bonds which, conditional on being strongly
misclassified (after adjustment for risk premium, liquidity and tax effects) on a par-
ticular date, are still strongly misclassified some months later. The results suggest
that misclassifications are diminish over time. Between half and two-thirds of the
misclassifications have been eliminated after six months, depending on the category.
Table 6 contains figures on the average change in spreads over different horizons
of bonds that are misclassified. The results demonstrate that the adjustment of
credit spread and ratings orderings over time shown by the Table 5 results is in part
attributable to movements in spreads. To take an example, AA-rated bonds that
are misclassified up represent cases in which the spreads suggest the bond is AAA
whereas the rating agency judges it AA. After 1, 3 and 6 months, spreads on average
rise by 3.9, 7.2 and 10.0 basis points as the market revises down its evaluation of the
credit quality of the borrower towards that of the rating agency.
On the other hand, as one may see from Table 7, the adjustment of the credit
quality orderings in some cases also involves adjustments in the assessment of the
rating agency that brings it closer to that of the bond market. The table shows
transition probabilities between rating categories worked out for the bonds in our
sample for 1, 2 and 3-year time horizons. To take an example, for all AAA-rated
bonds the sample probability of remaining at AAA after 1 year is 96.2%. Conditional
on being misclassified down (i.e., on the bond spread suggesting a AA rating) the
probability of remaining at AAA is just 85.0%.
Over a 3-year horizon, the contrast is even greater with AAA downgrade proba-
bilities being just 6.8% for AAA-grade bonds over all but 56.3% conditional on being
misclassified down. In general, the results in the table suggest that the “rating”
suggested by the bond market spread systematically adds information to the agency
rating in that it is useful in predicting changes in ratings.
It is possible that the differences between transition probabilities for bonds that
are strongly misclassified up and down shown in Table 7 reflect the subdivision of
rating categories into plus, minus and unqualified ratings grades, i.e., the sub ratings
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categories. To examine this, Table 8 reports transition probabilities for the finer
ratings grades when bonds are again sorted into strongly misclassified up or down or
not strongly misclassified. Fewer observations are available to estimate the transition
probabilities for these finer ratings grades but the effect evident in the results of
Table 7 is clearly still present. Transition probabilities of downgrades (upgrades) are
generally greater when the bonds are strongly misclassified down (up) than when they
are strongly misclassified up (down).
5 Conclusion
In this study, we identify and document substantial differences in the ordering of
credit standing implicit in bond market yields and ratings. For example, one quarter
of AA-rated bonds have inconsistent prices and ratings.
It is possible that the orderings implicit in yields and credit ratings differ even if
ratings agencies and bond market participants are correctly evaluating credit quality.
This will be the case if risk premiums, tax and liquidity effects are substantial. To
adjust for these influences, we regress residuals from defaultable bond term struc-
ture fits on risk premium betas and proxies for tax and liquidity effects. Using the
fitted part of the regressions to adjust for these effects, we reduce the number of
misclassifications significantly.
It is also true that the credit quality orderings implicit in ratings and bond spreads
are broadly consistent but that they adjust towards each other over time. We examine
the rate at which inconsistencies between ratings and spreads are eliminated over
time and find that after six months between half and two-thirds of inconsistencies
have disappeared.
We conclude that allowing (i) for economic determinants of spreads and (ii) for dy-
namic adjustments, the apparent and very substantial discrepancies between ratings
and bond market spreads can be accounted for.
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Table 1
A bond with a particular rating is “weakly reclassified” if its market price, Pi, is closer
in absolute magnitude to the price implied by average spreads associated with a different
rating than it is to the price implied by average spreads of bonds with the same rating.
A bond is “strongly misclassified up (down)” if Pi is greater (less) than the price implied
by spreads for a superior (inferior) rating. The left hand column is the actual rating of
the bond and row entries give the percentage in each rating category after reclassification
averaged over the months in the sample period.
Table 2
Each month in our sample the spread deviations for each category are separately regressed
on obligor and bond characteristics. The dependent variable in these regressions is spread
deviations expressed in basis points. The results presented are the average regressions
coefficients and T-statistics where the average is taken over each monthly regression in our
sample. Regressors except for the constant are demeaned. The coupon rate measured in
percent per annum, the issue size is measured in millions of dollars. The age regressor is
exp(-age) where age is the time since first issue in years.
Table 3
The results presented are the percentage of regressions (described in Table 1) in which the
independent variable is significant (at the 5% level) over our sample of monthly regressions.
Table 4
For each month in our sample the bonds in each agency rating category are reclassified on
the basis of the bonds spread deviation after adjusting for tax, liquidity and risk premiums.
We reclassify the bonds in two ways, ”weakly reclassified ratings” being a weaker condition
than ”strongly reclassified ratings”. The left hand column is the actual rating of the bond
and row entries give the percentage in each rating category after reclassification.
Table 5
The bonds that are strongly mis-rated after correction for tax,liquidity and risk premiums
are tracked over time to see if they remain mis-rated. The table reports the percentage of
bonds that remain mis-rated after various time horizons of 1,3,6 months. AAA-down are
bonds with an agency rating of AAA that have been reclassified into a lower rating category.
Table 6
The bonds that are strongly mis-rated (after correction for tax,liquidity and risk premiums)
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are tracked over time to see how their spread deviation changes over time (measured in basis
points). The table reports the average change in spread deviation (in basis points) over time
horizons of 1,3,6 months after being mis-rated. AAA-down are bonds which have an agency
rating of AAA but have been reclassified into a lower rating category. Standard errors are
calculated under the assumption that spread changes are independent.
Table 7
We calculate transition matrices conditional on the reclassified rating of the bonds (after
correction for tax,liquidity and risk premiums). The table reports transition probabilities
in percent for time horizons of 1, 2 and 3 years for strongly mis-rated bonds. The results
are aggregated into the coarse rating categories. ”AAA-down” are bonds which have an
agency rating of AAA but have been reclassified into a lower rating category. Bonds with
a reclassification of ”AAA” are bonds which have an agency rating of AAA and have a
reclassified rating of AAA. Standard errors in brackets are calculated under the assumption
that rating transitions are independent.
Table 8
We present one-year ratings transition probabilities in percent similar to those shown
in Table 7 but for fine rather than coarse ratings grades. The transition probabilities are
calculated for bonds sorted into (a) not strongly reclassified, (b) strongly reclassified up,
and (c) strongly reclassified down.
21
Table 1: Reclassification results
Reclassifications based on unadjusted spreads
Agency % weakly reclassified % strongly reclassified
rating AAA AA A AAA AA A
AAA 72.35 20.91 6.75 83.53 12.95 3.52
AA 32.69 43.03 24.28 18.25 72.00 9.75
A 6.56 22.51 70.92 2.95 10.77 86.28
Table 2: Bond spread regressions on bond characteristics and risk factors
Average regression coefficients and T-statistics
Independent AAA AA A
variables rated rated rated
Const -0.07 -0.23 -0.36
(-0.02) (-0.13) (-0.15)
Coupon 3.72 3.19 2.64
(4.67) (2.30) (2.18)
Exp(-Age) -9.66 -15.43 -14.01
(-1.98) (-1.98) (-2.02)
Quote Freq. -125.60 -140.17 -90.06
(-3.13) (-2.63) (-1.51)
Credit factor 11.66 9.11 7.06
(1.72) (1.53) (1.29)
Slope factor 47.68 43.09 29.08
(3.58) (2.62) (2.65)
Issue 8.46 -13.12 -2.24
(1.09) (-0.81) (-0.80)
Adj-R2 0.49 0.36 0.28
Num. of obs. 158.99 123.80 143.66
Table 3: Percentage of acceptances at 5% level in bond spread regressions
Independent AAA AA A
variables rated rated rated
Coupon 80.68 67.05 62.50
Exp(-Age) 65.91 67.05 51.14
Quote Freq. 75.00 76.14 52.27
Credit factor 84.09 80.68 62.50
Slope factor 79.55 70.45 72.73
Issue 40.91 15.91 28.41
Table 4: Reclassification results
Reclassifications based on tax liquidity and
risk-adjusted spreads
Agency % weakly reclassified % strongly reclassified
rating AAA AA A AAA AA A
AAA 78.58 18.67 2.76 90.81 7.97 1.22
AA 27.69 55.14 17.17 11.89 81.83 6.29
A 4.17 21.21 74.62 1.91 8.10 89.99
Table 5: Persistence of reclassifications
Time Percentage remaining strongly reclassified
period AAA down AA up AA down A up
1 month 64.90 65.22 62.72 62.35
3 months 54.86 58.08 53.29 50.73
6 months 50.34 55.64 36.23 32.41
Table 6: Change in spread conditional on reclassification
Time Strong reclassification
period AAA-down AA-up AA-down A-up
1 month -3.23 3.93 -3.50 4.18
(-8.47) (12.53) (-6.27) (13.98)
3 months -5.32 7.17 -3.32 7.80
(-6.68) (9.29) (-2.38) (10.98)
6 months -6.85 10.91 -3.68 10.21
(-3.94) (10.03) (-1.51) (7.50)
Table 7: 1-year sub-rating transition matrices
Panel 1: Bonds not strongly reclassified
AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB # bonds
AAA 96.64 2.56 0.71 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1131.00
AA+ 0.00 85.65 7.39 6.96 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 230.00
AA 0.75 1.13 82.26 11.70 2.64 1.13 0.38 0.00 265.00
AA- 0.99 0.00 0.66 86.14 8.58 2.97 0.66 0.00 303.00
A+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.39 86.46 7.81 1.82 0.52 384.00
A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 8.27 85.40 3.41 2.68 411.00
A- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.50 11.50 79.50 8.50 200.00
Panel 2: Bonds strongly reclassified down
AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB # bonds
AAA 87.80 5.69 4.88 0.81 0.00 0.81 0.00 0.00 123.00
AA+ 0.00 28.57 14.29 28.57 14.29 14.29 0.00 0.00 7.00
AA 0.00 0.00 85.71 14.29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.00
AA- 0.00 0.00 0.00 63.64 22.73 11.36 2.27 0.00 44.00
A+ . . . . . . . . 0.00
A . . . . . . . . 0.00
A- . . . . . . . . 0.00
Panel 2: Bonds strongly reclassified up
AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB # bonds
AAA . . . . . . . . 0.00
AA+ 0.00 90.77 6.15 3.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 65.00
AA 2.44 4.88 78.05 12.20 0.00 2.44 0.00 0.00 41.00
AA- 0.00 0.00 5.26 84.21 10.53 0.00 0.00 0.00 19.00
A+ 0.00 0.00 1.92 1.92 86.54 7.69 1.92 0.00 52.00
A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.11 89.19 2.70 0.00 37.00
A- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.22 77.78 0.00 9.00
Table 8: 2-year Transition matrix results
Panel 1: Bonds not reclassified
AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB # bonds
AAA 94.13 4.13 0.43 1.30 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 460.00
AA+ 0.00 75.26 11.34 10.31 1.03 2.06 0.00 0.00 97.00
AA 0.98 0.00 80.39 12.75 1.96 0.98 0.98 1.96 102.00
AA- 1.67 0.00 0.00 71.67 18.33 6.67 1.67 0.00 120.00
A+ 0.00 0.00 0.76 9.92 68.70 13.74 3.05 3.82 131.00
A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 11.18 77.63 7.89 2.63 152.00
A- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.33 13.92 64.56 15.19 79.00
Panel 2: Bonds reclassified down
AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB # bonds
AAA 70.45 9.09 4.55 9.09 4.55 2.27 0.00 0.00 44.00
AA+ 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.00 2.00
AA 0.00 0.00 66.67 33.33 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 3.00
AA- 4.76 0.00 4.76 47.62 19.05 23.81 0.00 0.00 21.00
A+ . . . . . . . . 0.00
A . . . . . . . . 0.00
A- . . . . . . . . 0.00
Panel 2: Bonds reclassified up
AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB # bonds
AAA . . . . . . . . 0.00
AA+ 0.00 82.35 5.88 5.88 5.88 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.00
AA 10.00 0.00 80.00 10.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.00
AA- 20.00 0.00 0.00 40.00 40.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00
A+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.67 86.67 6.67 0.00 0.00 30.00
A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.00 80.00 0.00 0.00 25.00
A- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 80.00 20.00 0.00 5.00
Table 9: 3-year Transition matrix results
Panel 1: Bonds not reclassified
AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB # bonds
AAA 93.25 3.97 1.19 1.19 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 252.00
AA+ 0.00 74.58 8.47 6.78 3.39 6.78 0.00 0.00 59.00
AA 0.00 0.00 72.22 20.37 3.70 0.00 1.85 1.85 54.00
AA- 4.69 0.00 0.00 70.31 21.88 3.13 0.00 0.00 64.00
A+ 0.00 0.00 3.17 6.35 57.14 15.87 12.70 4.76 63.00
A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 14.93 74.63 8.96 1.49 67.00
A- 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 22.22 59.26 18.52 27.00
Panel 2: Bonds reclassified down
AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB # bonds
AAA 43.75 12.50 6.25 25.00 6.25 0.00 6.25 0.00 16.00
AA+ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 1.00
AA 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
AA- 0.00 0.00 0.00 33.33 33.33 16.67 16.67 0.00 6.00
A+ . . . . . . . . 0.00
A . . . . . . . . 0.00
A- . . . . . . . . 0.00
Panel 2: Bonds reclassified up
AAA AA+ AA AA- A+ A A- BBB # bonds
AAA . . . . . . . . 0.00
AA+ 0.00 66.67 16.67 0.00 16.67 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.00
AA 100.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00
AA- 0.00 0.00 0.00 50.00 50.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00
A+ 0.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 80.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.00
A 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 100.00 0.00 0.00 3.00
A- . . . . . . . . 0.00
Table 10: Coarse-rated transition matrices over long horizons
Strong reclassification
1 year matrix 2 year matrix 3 year matrix
Reclassification up stay down up stay down up stay down
AAA 0.00 96.19 3.81 0.00 94.13 5.87 0.00 93.25 6.75
(0.00) (0.61) (0.61) (0.00) (1.10) (1.10) (0.00) (1.58) (1.58)
AAA down 0.00 85.00 15.00 0.00 70.45 29.55 0.00 43.75 56.25
(0.00) (3.57) (3.57) (0.00) (6.88) (6.88) (0.00) (12.40) (12.40)
AA up 4.55 81.82 13.64 6.25 75.00 18.75 20.00 50.00 30.00
(2.22) (4.11) (3.66) (4.28) (7.65) (6.90) (12.65) (15.81) (14.49)
AA 1.47 82.67 15.86 0.94 75.55 23.51 1.69 72.32 25.99
(0.46) (1.45) (1.40) (0.54) (2.41) (2.37) (0.97) (3.36) (3.30)
AA down 0.00 56.00 44.00 7.69 46.15 46.15 0.00 37.50 62.50
(0.00) (7.02) (7.02) (5.23) (9.78) (9.78) (0.00) (17.12) (17.12)
A up 7.69 85.71 6.59 18.33 78.33 3.33 12.50 87.50 0.00
(2.79) (3.67) (2.60) (5.00) (5.32) (2.32) (11.69) (11.69) (0.00)
A 7.47 84.20 8.32 13.26 71.55 15.19 14.01 64.97 21.02
(0.86) (1.19) (0.90) (1.78) (2.37) (1.89) (2.77) (3.81) (3.25)





